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WEST, MACINTYRE, AND WOJTYLA: POPE
JOHN PAUL IFS CONTRIBUTION TO THE

DEVELOPMENT OF A DEPENDENCYBASED THEORY OF JUSTICE
ELIZABETH R. SCHILTZt
In recent decades, a strand of feminist theory variously
referred to as "care feminism," "cultural feminism," or "relational
feminism" has been arguing for a social re-evaluation of what has
traditionally been regarded as "women's work"-the care of
dependents, such as children and elderly or disabled family
members. As part of that project, a number of feminists have
suggested that the traditional liberal theory of justice, based on
the ideal of autonomous, independent actors, should be rejected,
or at least revised to reflect the reality of dependency in the life
of every individual. Recent books offering such alternative,
dependency-based theories of justice include: Joan Tronto, Moral
Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care;1 Eva
Feder Kittay, Love's Labor;2 Robin L. West, Caring for Justice;3
Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work
Conflict and What To Do About It; 4 and Martha Albertson
t Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota). I thank the organizers of and participants in this symposium for their
varied insights into this aspect of Pope John Paul II's multi-faceted legacy. I am also
grateful for the introduction to the work of Alisdaire MacIntyre that I received at a
week-long faculty seminar on Alisdaire MacIntyre's Critique of Modernity, hosted by
the Catholic Studies Department of the University of St. Thomas and directed by
Professor David Solomon of the Philosophy Department of the University of Notre
Dame in June 2004.
1 JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC
OF CARE (1993) (putting women's caregiving role into political context).
2 EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR (1999) (describing different theories of

justice and arguing that they should be based upon the requirements of
dependency).
3 ROBIN L. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997) (arguing for recognition of distinct
experiences and perspectives of women in jurisprudence).
4 JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND

WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) (urging necessary reform in the workplace to better
accommodate women's caregiving responsibilities).
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Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency.5 This
theory has been developed by these feminist writers largely in
the context of arguments for restructuring the work place and
welfare policies to support women with primary caregiving
responsibilities. 6 A number of writers have begun to explore the
application of a dependency-based theory of justice in other
contexts. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, in Dependent,
Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, after
acknowledging his debt to the feminist writers, goes on to apply
their insight to general systems of moral philosophy. 7 He argues
that recognition of the inevitable periods of dependency in all
human lives necessitates political and social structures that
protect all society members unable to advocate for themselves
due to disabilities-not just women engaged in caregiving8 In
Robin West's recent book, Re-Imagining Justice,9 she places the
dependency-based theory into a more general theory of justice
with applications that extend beyond the concerns of women
engaged in caregiving. 10
In two prior articles, I have described how Pope John Paul
II's writings on the role of women in the family and in the public
sphere are compatible with much of this emerging strand of
feminist theory, supporting many of their arguments for
restructuring the workplace and political structures to
accommodate caregivers. 11 In this essay, I will explore the extent
to which his writings also support more general applications of a

5 MARTHA

ALBERTSON

FINEMAN,

THE

AUTONOMY

MYTH:

A

THEORY

OF

DEPENDENCY (2004) (describing the many stages of life that necessitate dependency

on others).
6 See supra notes 1-5.
7 ALASDAIR

C. MACINTYRE,

DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS:

WHY HUMAN

BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 3 (1999).
6 See id. at 8-9.
9 ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF

FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003).
10 See id. at 1-11 (explaining various interpretations of 'legal justice" and

suggesting that we need to create alternative conceptions of the term).
11 See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Should Bearing the Child Mean Bearing All the
Cost? A Catholic Perspective on the Sacrifice of Motherhood and the Common Good,
10 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT & CULTURE (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Sacrifice],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=814104; Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Motherhood and

the Mission: What Catholic Law Schools Could Learn from Harvard about Women,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Mothers], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=894980.
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dependency-based theory of justice in other contexts, such as
those suggested by MacIntyre and West.
I will first describe the dependency-based theory of justice as
developed by feminist writers in support of a social re-evaluation
of the caregiving work performed predominately by women.
Then, I will describe the arguments developed by MacIntyre and
West that generalize this dependency-based theory of justice to
other contexts. Next, I will turn to the writings of John Paul the
Great, first exploring the ways in which his writings on women
support the application of the dependency-based theory of justice
particularly to the caregiving work performed predominantly by
women.
After that, I will look for evidence of overall
compatibility between John Paul's personalist philosophy and a
more general dependency-based theory of justice. Finally, I will
suggest briefly how such a theory of justice, as developed by John
Paul II, might be applied to other areas of law in ways that
reflect Catholic teachings.
I.

APPLICATION OF THE DEPENDENCY-BASED THEORY OF
JUSTICE DEVELOPED BY FEMINIST LEGAL THEORISTS TO

CONTEXTS OTHER THAN MOTHERHOOD

A.

Development of a Dependency-Based Theory of Justice in the
12
Context of Motherhood

Over the past few decades, a group of feminist legal theorists
has undertaken a project of re-examining one of the central
presuppositions
of "the liberal theory that dominates
contemporary American political thought," namely, its "heavy
reliance on the image of the autonomous individual and the
societal structures built on this image . .."13 This strand of
feminist thought argues that political and social structures built
on this faulty notion of the paradigm of human nature are flawed
because they fail to acknowledge that every human being is
actually totally dependent on others at the beginning of life, as
well as sometimes at the end of and throughout life. 14 Failure to
recognize not only the fact of this dependency for the humans
".

This section is a summary of arguments made in Sacrifice, supra note 11.
Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman's
The Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285, 1288-89 (2005). For examples of the
arguments of these feminist legal theorists, see the articles cited supra note 11.
14 See Eichner, supra note 13, at 1288.
12
13
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experiencing it, but also the fact that other human beings must
care for the humans experiencing the dependency, has resulted
in flawed political and social structures. 15 Most particularly,
these feminist theorists point out that the failure to recognize
this dependency has resulted in injustice toward women who
have traditionally done most of the work of caring for dependent
human beings. 16 Because our political theories fail to even
acknowledge this aspect of the human condition, they fail to
accord any value to the work of caring for dependent human
beings. As a result, neither the need for care nor the provision of
care has been seen as an aspect of the human condition deserving
of the same sorts of legal protections afforded those aspects of the
human condition representing our autonomy.
The dependency theorists reject arguments by some
feminists that women's advancement requires that men assume
an equal share of this undervalued care work or that women
refuse to provide undervalued care work. 17 Neither of these
"solutions" would require any re-evaluation of justice. A concept
of justice emerging from the traditional liberal theory based on
the autonomous individual would adequately support the
commitment to formal equality of men and women that would
suffice to ensure that men and women engaging in an equal
amount of care work, or no care work, have an equal opportunity
to advance professionally and financially.
Instead, the dependency theorists contend that either women
do not want to give up this work,' 8 or that it is practically
See id.
There is significant documentation of the manifestation of this injustice with
respect to both wages and career advancement of women with children, as opposed
to women without children or men with children. See Sacrifice, supra note 11, at 1-3
& nn.2-6; Mothers, supra note 11, at 10-18 nn.9-49 and accompanying text.
17 For examples of these arguments see Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple
Pie?A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Carefor
Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1761-62 (2001), Katherine
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 197 (2001), and Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881,
1903-05 (2000).
Is See, e.g., KITTAY, supra note 2, at 188.
Radical visions in which dependency work is taken out of the family have
left many women cold-largely, I suggest, because they have failed to
respect the importance of the dependency relationship. A view of society as
consisting of nested dependencies, so constituted as to provide all with the
means to achieve functioning that respects the freedom and relatedness of
all citizens, is a view that can only emerge now, as women taste the fruits
15
16
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unlikely that the "socially constructed role of mother" will ever
change to the extent that women will not continue to perform
significantly more care work than men. 19 Given this reality,
women will not be able to achieve "justice" within the structures
created on the foundations of traditional liberal theory. For this
reason, the dependency theorists find it necessary to construct a
new theory of justice, one that recognizes the value of the care
work being performed by women and that prevents them from
being disadvantaged by their performance of such work. 20
At this point, it is worth spending some time considering
what these feminist theorists mean when they talk about
"justice." I do not think they are thinking about justice in terms
as broad as the classical categories of 'distributive,'
'commutative,' or 'retributive' justice. 2 1 In the writings with
which I am concerned, these theorists are writing as "feminists,"
rather than political philosophers in the abstract. Although the
content of this term is notoriously amorphous, 22 I think it is fair
to say that, fundamentally, feminism consists of "an organized
way of thought and action that gives special attention to

of an equality fashioned by men-and find it wanting.
Id.; see also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 71 & n.72
(2002) (citing studies emphasizing the rewarding nature of motherhood).
19 See FINEMAN, supra note 5, at 171. Fineman states the following:
There is no known society in all of human history in which care work went
from being women's work to equally divided between the sexes. .... Perhaps
an equal division of care work might be possible in the future. Who can
say? Even if it is, however, we need alternative strategies for the short
term, ways in which women's well being can be improved and inequality
lessened even though women continue to do most caretaking work.
Id.; see also Joan Williams, "It's Snowing Down South" How to Help Mothers and
Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 828
(2002); Becker, supra note 18, at 93.
20 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 1902-03 (describing ways in which women can
create value in the care work that they provide).
21 See generally JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 43-113 (1966)
(explaining justice, one of the four Cardinal virtues).
22 For two examples of the many possible ways in which feminists can disagree
about the meaning of the term, I recommend the collection of essays in WOMEN IN
CHRIST: TOWARD A NEW FEMINISM (Michele M. Schumacher ed., 2003) [hereinafter
WOMEN IN CHRIST], and the exchange in the following three articles: Elizabeth FoxGenovese, Catholic and Feminist: Can One Be Both?, 2 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT &
CULTURE 11 (1999); Corrine Patton, Catholic and Feminist: We Are Called to Be
Both, 2 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT & CULTURE 27 (1999); and Elizabeth FoxGenovese, Response to Corrine Patton, 2 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT & CULTURE 39
(1999).
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23
removing obstacles to the full development of women."
Disagreements within feminism stem from differing convictions
about what the obstacles are or how to overcome them. Given
that the primary agenda for the dependency theorists is the
advancement of women, when they talk about reforming the
theory of justice, they are typically talking about addressing
those aspects of our social or political systems that represent
unfairness toward women, as opposed to men.
There are two steps to the project of the dependency
feminists. First, they must argue that caregiving is a good that
should be accorded a higher social value than is currently the
case. Second, they must consider the specific ways in which
society should recognize that higher value. With respect to the
first argument, the dependency theorists generally argue that
raising children benefits the whole of society by ensuring new
generations of healthy, capable citizens and workers. 24 In
developing this argument, some stress its economic aspects in
claiming that the current situation, in which mothers pay the
disproportionate cost of this benefit, allows our market
institutions, as well as men in general and even childless women,
to be "'free-riders' appropriating the labor of the caretaker for
their own purposes." 25 Others focus more on the argument's
that
arguing
example
for
aspects,
philosophical
"facilitating... care is a core component of a governmental
'formative project' to foster persons' capacities for democratic and
personal self-government, to secure free and equal citizenship,
and, thereby, to help them live good lives." 26 Still others focus on
the effect of caregiving on the development of healthy and
27
morally sound members of society.

23 Prudence Allen, Can Feminism Be a Humanism?, in WOMEN IN CHRIST,
supra note 22, at 251, 284.
24 See Eichner, supra note 13, at 1312-13.
25 Id. at 1312.
26 Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources,
and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1688 (2001).
27 MONA

HARRINGTON,

CARE AND

EQUALITY:

INVENTING

A

NEW

FAMILY

POLITICS 49 (1999) (citing TRONTO, supra note 2, at 167). Mona Harrington writes:
We need to elevate care to this level of importance for the basic reason that
it is essential to human health and balanced development. It is also crucial
to developing human moral potential, to instilling and reinforcing in an
individual a sense of positive connection to others. And it is this sense of
connection that makes possible the whole range of mutual responsibilities
that allow the people of a society to respect and work toward common goals.
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It is in the second step of the argument that the dependency
theorists find it necessary to confront the notion of "justice." A
society based on traditional liberal theories of justice could
effectuate this re-valuation of dependency care simply by
subsidizing women while they are caring for their children in the
home. Employers could demonstrate respect for the social value
of childcare, for example, by making it easy for women who
become pregnant to quit their jobs to pursue the socially valuable
work of childcare, and providing bonuses to men who have
children. Governments could demonstrate respect for the social
value of childcare by increasing direct and indirect subsidies for
women who quit their jobs to engage in childcare. Such an
outcome would be entirely consistent with a notion of justice that
rests on a commitment to formal equality. Women without
significant dependency-care obligations could be treated just like
men without significant dependency-care obligations.
Both
employers and the government could support structures and laws
that protected the equal treatment of these equals. Women (or
men) with significant dependency-care obligations would be
accorded respect, in the form of financial subsidy for their
dependency-care work, but need not be treated like either men or
women without any such obligations, since they are not "equal"
in terms of their ability to provide uninterrupted labor.
Recognizing this possibility, the dependency theorists argue
that the traditional equality-based notion of justice should be
replaced by a dependency-based notion of justice. 28 This new
notion of justice begins with the conviction that society should
properly value the services of caregivers. Instead of harnessing
that notion with the demand of strict equality of treatment, it
attempts to place that idea into a construct that accommodates
generosity in treatment of people based on the needs of their
dependents. As Mary Becker argues:
An abstract commitment to equality, understood as treating
similarly those similarly situated, will do little to help eliminate
real social inequalities, since those who are unequal (the rich
As political theorist Joan Tronto puts it, thinking about care seriously,
recognizing that everyone at different times is both a giver and a receiver of
care, underscores for people the fact of their personal and social
interdependence. And, she says, this insight can enhance a commitment to

the responsibilities of democratic citizenship.
Id.
28

See, e.g., KITTAY, supra note 2, at 1.
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and the poor, the able and the disabled, women who are
caretakers as well as workers and men who are primarily
workers) will not be similarly situated. On the other hand, a
commitment to help those in need can translate into an
obligation of those who are best off to help those in far different
circumstances because of "shared fellow feeling." To the extent
that such empathy actually exists, there will be a commitment
29
to doing something despite, indeed because of, differences.
The dependency-based theory of justice advocates more than
just subsidizing female caregivers; it also supports the much
more difficult work of restructuring workplaces and social
structures to accommodate child raising and other forms of
dependency care to allow mothers to continue to participate in
the public sphere. The rationale behind such support would be
our social consensus about two things: first, that child raising is
a public good; and second, that we are justified in making
accommodations for caregivers that we would not make for other
workers. Such a rationale recognizes the reality that "children
[and some of the elderly and disabled] are human beings in need
who are not capable of supporting themselves."3 0 It is precisely
in order to create such a social consensus that the dependency
theorists have embarked on their critique of the dominant liberal
political theory, exalting only the values of autonomy. In the
words of Mona Harrington, we need to "add care to the pantheon
of national social values.., to assure good care to all members of
the society should become a primary principle of our common life,
31
along with the assurance of liberty, equality, and justice."
The dependency theorists translate these general principles
into specific calls for changes to various social structures that
would enable mothers to engage in care work without undue
penalties to career or financial security. These proposals include
changes to welfare and tax policies to directly subsidize unpaid
childcare work by mothers, 32 paid maternity leave and
guarantees of job protection while on maternity leave, 33 and more

29
30
31
32

Becker, supra note 18, at 60.
Id. at 83.
HARRINGTON, supra note 27, at 48.
See Becker, supra note 18, at 59-60, 105, 108-09 (proposing family

allowances, as offered in France); ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD

186, 201, 265-66 (2001) (criticizing the United States' tax policy).
33 See CRITTENDEN, supra note 32, at 259; KITTAY, supra note 2, at 134;
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112.
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radical proposals to restructure the workplace itself to permit
mothers (and, incidentally, also fathers) to spend significant time
caring for their families without undue penalties in career
34
advancement.
The dependency-based theory of justice was developed in this
particular context of feminist theory, with the agenda of enabling
full participation of women in all social structures. Some writers,
however, have begun attempting to apply the notion to more
general contexts. I will now turn to a discussion of two of these
writers: first, the dependency feminist Robin West; and second,
the philosopher Alisdaire Maclntyre.
B.

Generalizingthe Dependency-Based Theory of Justice

1.

Robin West

West begins her project of "re-imagining justice" 35 generally
with what I find to be an eminently pragmatic and useful
conception of "justice" for our particular purposes as lawyers.
She asks, "What do we mean by legal justice; the justice we hope
law promotes? What is the justice that lawyers and judges,
peculiarly, are professionally committed to pursue, the virtue
around which, arguably, the legal profession and the individuals
within it have defined their public lives?" 36 This notion of justice
does not correspond precisely to the classical categories of
"distributive," "social," and "retributive" justice; rather, it is a
more pragmatic concept, the ideal "to which we urge our students
to dedicate themselves."3 7 After bemoaning the lack of legal
scholarship fleshing out this concept, she offers the proposition
that "legal justice," as practically understood by lawyers in the
United States today, encompasses a commitment to three
8
notions: the rule of law, a regime of rights, and formal equality. 3

34

Examples include instituting mandatory thirty-hour work weeks for all

workers, amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to eliminate the exemption from
overtime pay requirements for managerial workers for all work over thirty to thirtyfive hours per week, creating non-marginalized alternative work schedules, and
instituting flextime or shorter work hours without career advancement penalties for
persons with caregiving responsibilities. Becker, supra note 18, at 81; CRITTENDEN,
supra note 32, at 260-61; WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 92, 111.
35 WEST, supra note 9, at 1.
36

Id.

37 Id.
38 Id.

at 1-2.
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West argues that, over the past thirty years, one particular
conception of each of these three notions has come to dominate
legal theory. 39 In each case, this dominant conception is flawed,
giving rise to an inadequate interpretation of the virtue of legal
justice. She proposes an alternative interpretation of each of
these three notions, leading, she argues, to a more progressive
40
notion of "legal justice."
The idea of dependency is only relevant to West's discussion
of the second and third notions. 41 Let us first examine how she
incorporates the dependency concept in her discussion of the
contemporary liberal rights theory.
She describes the
contemporary American "liberal-constitutional understanding of
rights" as relying on the state's constitution to enumerate certain
rights upon which the state may not impinge; these enumerated
rights secure various aspects of our shared human nature as
autonomous, rational individuals, and give each of us an equal
right to things such as free speech, free exercise of religion,
privacy, property, and equal protection of the law. 42 West agrees
with much of the "rights critique" emerging in the past twentyfive years in the legal academies of the United States, England,
Canada, and Australia. 43 Because she sees value in retaining the
rhetoric of rights, however, she proposes to address the flaws by
re-conceptualizing "rights," rather than rejecting them. 44
West identifies three contemporary critiques of the dominant
rights theory, with which she largely agrees. 45
First, the
39 See id. at 2-3.

Id. at 3-4.
Briefly, West describes the contemporary American conception of the rule of
law to consist of "fidelity to the existing rules of law, and of consistency regarding
their application," by the judges called upon to apply those rules. Id. at 13. It is the
rule of law that constrains judges to finding, interpreting, and applying the law,
rather than creating the law. Id. Courts are required to resolve cases on the basis of
agreed-upon rules, applied in a neutral, apolitical manner. West criticizes both the
contemporary critics and advocates of this notion of rule of law, at least those in the
legal academy, for sharing the conviction that judicial fidelity to law is the only
relevant aspect of the rule of law. See id. at 15. She argues for a wider
understanding of rule of law concept. See id. at 16. She recaptures two important
elements that have been ignored by the legal academy in recent years: Thomas
Hobbes' notion that it represents "a commitment to the political process and its legal
fruits over natural warfare," and Thomas Paine's notion that it represents a
commitment to representative democracy. Id at 55.
42 Id. at 71-72.
43 See id. at 73.
44 See id. at 74 ("We need to mend it, not end it.").
45 See id. at 74-75 (stating the reasons critics feel that rights theory frustrates
40

41
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dominant theory is entirely negative with respect to the
obligations of states in that it only limits states, rather than
imposing any affirmative obligations upon them. Thus, it is
"fundamentally at odds with any purported state obligation to
ensure the natural preconditions of a good society."46 Second, the
negativity of the dominant rights theory also "limits the states'
power to fight the damaging consequences of private sphere
subordination," leaving the powerful free to exploit the powerless
in the private sphere. 47 Third, the dominant rights theory is
based on a fundamentally false conception of human nature as
"self-sufficient,
idiosyncratic,
autonomous,
free-thinking,
48
rational, insular and atomistic."
This disregard for the relational, social aspect of human
nature has a number of negative consequences. 49 It undermines
peoples' sense of communal solidarity and responsibility for
It ignores the human capability for
others' welfare. 50
relationships as being as worthy an object of protection through
rights as the human capability for autonomy. 51 Further, it
prevents the state from supporting any particular conception of a
"good society," since each individual's conception of a "good life" is
Finally, by resting on a
protected from state interference.
of human nature, 52 it
understanding.
fundamentally false
negatively affects society's moral sense. 53 West writes:
We are not insular atoms, sufficient unto ourselves wanting
nothing but to be left alone. Rather, for substantial parts of our
lives, we are dependent on the caregiving of others for our very
survival, and throughout our lives, we remain interdependent
social beings. These basic social and biological facts of life,
furthermore, inform not just our self-understanding, but our
moral sense as well: we have moral obligations to the weak and
to those dependent on us, and we know we have those moral
obligations, because we know we have been, and will be, weak
and dependent ourselves. We sympathize with others in crisis
or in need, and we depend on their sympathetic response when
the goals of society).
46 Id. at 76-77.
47 See id. at 77.
48

Id. at 81.

49 See id.
50 See id. at 79.
51 See id. at 80.
52

See id.

53 See id. at 81.
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we are in need ourselves. We build community because we are
communal creatures who depend on it. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the liberal world, justified by a false
understanding of who we are, is so apparently morally barren.
It is at war with [our] moral intuitions about the way in which
we ought to live, because it is at war with the true conception of
54
our nature that informs our moral sense.
Rather than entirely discard rights theory, however, West
urges a correction of the flaws noted above. 55 She argues that
there is no logical reason that rights must be viewed only as
constraints on state action; rights could be seen as compelling
state action. 56 Furthermore, she argues that there is no logical
reason that rights must be based on this falsely atomistic
conception of human nature; rights could be recognized that
respect both our individuality and our social nature. 57 She
argues that there are many reasons to attempt these corrections
to rights theory. 58 She claims that there is a rhetorical value to
the language of rights, in that it prompts the state to think in
terms of morality. 59
More pragmatically, she argues that
abandoning rights talk in legal scholarship would prevent
development of a scholarship of positive rights in areas that
could benefit from this jurisprudence, such as welfare, education,
labor, environmental protection, and caregiving. 60
This lack of scholarship could also have doctrinal costs if
practicing lawyers are left with nothing but policy arguments to
counter the already well-developed negative rights arguments in
courts of law; specific rights will always trump general policies. 6 1
Finally, West worries that the lack of positive rights
jurisprudence has left the field open for the current dominance in
legal analysis in general, not just in rights discourse, of the
2
economic cost-benefit analysis.6

54 Id.

55 See id. at 82-83 ("[T]he rights critics' conclusion-that we should abandon,
rather than reform, rights-is overbroad ....
56 See id. at 83.
57 See id.
58 See id.
at 88-89 (stating that there are many costs associated
abandoning rights as opposed to just correcting them).
59 See id. at 88.
60 See id. at 88-89.
61 See id. at 89-91.
62 See id. at 91-92.

with
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For these reasons, she proposes a reconstruction of the rights
tradition which would embrace positive and relational rights, as
well as negative and individualist rights; the liberal state
employing this full panoply of rights could conceive of them as
protecting both human autonomy and human capabilities. 63 The
major substantive difference in West's reconceived rights theory
would be the addition of a number of fundamental rights to the
"core" rights that a state would have the duty to protect. In
addition to the current liberal core rights to autonomy, contract,
and property, she would add welfare rights, rights to work, a
right to security against private violence,
and-most
interestingly for our purposes-the "right to provide care." 64
This new rights theory would be based on a recognition that
human nature inevitably involves periods of dependency (always
at the beginning and often near the end of life), and that most
human lives also involve even longer periods in which others
(children or aged parents) are dependent on them. 6 5 Thus, this
new rights regime would need to offer rights that protect us not
only as autonomous individuals, but also when we are in the
dependent state, and protect those caring for us when we are in
that dependent state. 66 West writes:
[W]hen we are acting as caregivers, we need not rights that
falsely presuppose our autonomy and independence, but rights
that frankly acknowledge our relational reality: when infants,
children, or aging parents are dependent upon us, we are
dependent upon others for support and sustenance. People who
are providing care to dependants are themselves in need of
assistance from others, and caregivers will eventually become,
again, dependents in need of care themselves. That circle of
mutual need, caregiving, dependency, and assistance, is as
much a part of our social contract, as is the individual's
relinquishment of rights to self-defense in exchange for a right
to protection against violence.
A rights tradition that
forthrightly acknowledged the natural reality of our inescapable
dependence on each other-to say nothing of our social nature63 See id. at 92. West adopts Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen's conception
of the "good society" that would support such a rights theory as one in which
"citizens possess those fundamental capabilities which are themselves essential to
the enjoyment of a fully human life." Id.
64 Id. at 92-94.
65 Id. at 94.
66 Id. at 95.
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would give pride of place to "relational rights" that would
protect the caregiver, and hence the care bestowed in
67
dependency relationships.
West argues that a right to care should be recognized for the
same reasons that have traditionally justified recognition or
construction of rights in liberal, democratic societies: first, a
recognition that whatever is protected by the right is likely to be
systematically undervalued by the standard political or economic
process; second, a belief that failure to recognize the right will
lead to a severe adverse effect on some historically subordinated
group; and third, to underscore our most fundamental and
shared inter-generational values. 68 All three apply with respect
69
to the right to care.
Caregiving will always be undervalued in the market,
because the motivation to engage in caregiving stems from an
ethical, emotional commitment, rather than any sort of rational
decision. 70 Neither the market nor the political process has any
incentive to properly value caregiving, since caregivers will not
abandon that work, no matter what the cost to the caregiver.7 1
Moreover, women constitute the group that has historically
assumed the work of caregiving, and they continue to suffer the
inegalitarian adverse consequences of the state's failure to
protect them in doing so. 7 2 Finally, the right of care is necessary
to "better express our self-understanding as a species for whom
caregiving is a central life activity .... We flourish both
individually and communally when decent care is provided, and
we suffer when it is not. 73
West thinks that the practical consequences of the
recognition of such a right could be significant.7 4 It could provide
judicial protection against state actions that endanger caregiving
(such as welfare legislation that penalizes parents who do not
work full time), and provide positive rights to state support of
caregiving labor (such as expanding the support provided by the

67
68

Id. (footnote omitted).
See id.

69 Id. at 97.
70

Id. at 95-96.

71 Id.
72

Id. at 96.

73 Id.
74 See id. at 97.
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West also thinks that a
Family Medical Leave Act). 75
constitutional basis for such a right might be found in the
substantive due process clause, which, she argues, prominently
included a "right to parent" until the more restrictive reading
76
following Eisenstadt v. Baird.
To summarize, West uses the notion of dependency in two
places in her critique of the dominant theory of rights. First, her
recognition that human nature inevitably involves extended
periods of dependency and of the care of dependents 77 is the basis
for a critique of the flawed conception of human nature upon
which the dominant rights theory is based. 78 Second, it is the
of
justification for adding a "right to provide care" to the panoply 79
"core rights" that ought to be recognized by a new rights theory.
Let us now turn to West's discussion of the third aspect of
legal justice-commitment to formal equality. West describes
this commitment on the part of contemporary legal theorists as a
commitment to a fundamental form of legal reasoning-the
analogical reasoning that we sometimes refer to as "thinking like
a lawyer."8 0 This type of reasoning forms the basis of the
primary distinction between the role of judges (and the law)-to
make decisions based on categorizing new situations as being
like or not like past situations settled by law-and the role of
legislatures (and politics)-to shape laws based on policy
judgments about the goals to be attained in the future. 8 1 The
idea that it is possible or desirable to engage in this sort of
reasoning has been criticized by legal realists, critical legal
scholars, and identity theorists.8 2 They argue that this is not
possible to do in a genuinely neutral manner; some preconceived
"yardstick" is always applied to the categorization of any new
83
situation as being "like" or "not like" a past situation.

75

Id.

405 U.S. 438 (1972), cited in WEST, supra note 9, at 97 & n.59; see also WEST,
supra note 9, at 97 & n.60 (collecting early cases defining "right to parent" from its
inception).
77 See WEST, supra note 9, at 94-97.
78 See id. at 92.
79 Id. at 94.
80 Id. at 116.
76

81

Id.

82

Id. at 109.

83

Id. at 124.
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Again, West argues that while there is some validity to this
criticism, it would be wiser to reform the notion of formal
equality than to discard it altogether.8 4 She argues that the
notion of formal equality rests on a sound moral intuition about
the law, regardless of how imperfectly that intuition has been
applied.8 5 She does not think that either of the two dominant
contemporary defenses of formal equality adequately captures
that moral intuition because, again, each is based on a flawed
86
understanding of human nature.
One of these contemporary defenses of formal equality that
West identifies and critiques is "traditionalism."8 7 This school
sees formal equality as playing a significant role in preserving
culture, "the rules, traditions and relations that structure social
life."88 Formal equality respects the nature of the human being
as having an identity that is "an amalgam of his social and
cultural identities" by respecting and preserving traditional
social arrangements and relationships.8 9 West rejects the idea
that our identity is so tightly tied to our traditional social roles;
she does not think that this conception of "formal equality"
provides the necessary tools to break free of the constraints of
such roles. 90
It is in her critique of the alternative contemporary defense
of "formal equality" that West sees, again, a role for dependency
theory. 9 1 This is the utilitarian or economic argument for a
commitment to formal equality. 92 This defense rests on the
notion that human nature shares only one trait-we are all selfaware, self-interested individuals capable of maximizing our own
self interest. 93 Since the only thing we all share is this selfinterest, maximizing our ability to make the choices we need to
serve this self interest is the primary goal of law. 94 Formal
Id. at 129-30.
See id.
86 See id. at 130 (discussing an example of the flawed understanding of human
nature through a passage in Huck Finn).
87 Id.
at 139 (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition,99 YALE L.J.
1029, 1041 (1990)).
88 Id. at 139.
89 Id. at 140.
84
85

90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 Id.

at
at
at
at

146.
145.
144.
135.
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equality serves this same end; it maximizes our freedom by
increasing law's predictability. 95
West asserts that this
conception of human nature, like the conception of human nature
underlying the contemporary rights theory, is flawed because it
ignores the fact that humans do share something in addition to
the desire to maximize self interest. 96 All humans share "a
lengthy period of infantile dependency, a primal desire to form
powerful human attachments to meet the needs created by that
dependency, as well as vulnerabilities that result from those
97
attachments and from the longing for them."
West proposes what she calls a humanistic account of formal
equality. She describes such a proposition as follows:
By "treating likes alike" through law, we recognize and reaffirm
a universal and complex human nature, and the equal moral
worth of all who fall within the same legal regime. When we
recognize someone as "like us," and therefore entitled to like
treatment by law, we acknowledge that shared humanity, and
acknowledge the inclusion of all in a circle constituted by
98
mutual recognition and sympathy.
In this account, our
[s]hared, universal traits... are not limited to a capacity for
choice, our desire to individuate ourselves through the exercise
of our individual will, and an ability to bargain and profit
through unfettered markets.
We share our mortality,
vulnerability to sickness and pain, needs for nurturance, a
lengthy period of infantile total dependency, and a capacity for
sympathetic engagement with the wellbeing of others, to name
a few. We share social as well as individual needs, a capacity
for communal life as well as for self-assertion. 99
West argues that the moral externalities identified by the
other two defenses of formal equality-tradition and liberty-are
not sufficient to withstand the critiques of formal equality. 10 0
She therefore proposes a humanistic account of formal equality,
which supplements tradition and liberty with: (1) the moral
principle of an "egalitarian regard for all, regardless of status,"
and (2) the moral principle she terms "ethical cosmopolitanism,"
95 Id. at 135-36.
96 See id. at 145.
97 Id.

Id. at 149-50.
99 Id. at 152.
100 See id. at 156.
98
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consisting in a recognition of the worth of all, regardless of their
nationality.101
To summarize, just as she did in her account of the rights
theory, West uses the notion of dependency in two places in her
critique of the dominant theory of formal equality. 10 2 First, she
uses it as the basis for a critique of the flawed conception of
human nature upon which one of the dominant contemporary
defenses of the concept of formal equality is based. 10 3 Second, she
builds recognition of the shared dependency of all humans into
her new humanistic account of formal equality: All humans are
of equal moral worth by virtue of their shared experiences of
04
dependency, as well as their shared experiences of autonomy.
2.

Alasdair MacIntyre

In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre is not concerned
with West's pragmatic concept of "legal justice," or even with a
theory of "justice" at all. Rather, he is interested in the following
question: "[W]hat difference to moral philosophy would it make,
if we were to treat the facts of vulnerability and affliction and the
10 5
related facts of dependence as central to the human condition?"'
Although MacIntyre does not discuss conceptions of justice, his
account of a dependency-based theory of moral philosophy
includes a discussion of the types of political and social
structures necessary to achieve the common good which such a
moral philosophy would ultimately serve. 10 6
The role of
dependency in MacIntyre's discussion demonstrates some
striking similarities and equally interesting differences from its
role in West's theory of justice.' 0 7 A comparison of these roles
provides another useful framework for considering how the
concept of dependency can be generalized beyond the context of
motherhood.

101 Id. at 156.

See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
105 MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 4.
106 See id. at 129-30, 144-46 (setting forth three conditions that must be
satisfied before political and social structures can effectively realize the potential for
common good in relationships of dependence, and exploring the possibility for the
realization of this common good in the context of local communities).
107 See id.; see also infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
102
103
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Maclntyre begins his book with the idea that a correct
understanding of human nature requires a "reassertion of human
animality."'108 He draws on both Aristotle and Aquinas to support
his claim that human nature is primarily an embodied, and
therefore animal, nature. 10 9 Quoting Aquinas, he reminds us:
"Since the soul is part of the body of a human being, the soul is
not the whole human being and my soul is not I."' 1 MacIntyre
critiques a host of philosophical arguments suggesting bright-line
distinctions between humans and other animals, all focusing on
aspects of human language as being indicative of the ability to
hold beliefs, and thus marks of "human" as opposed to animal
natures. 1 ' MacIntyre thinks it is important to address these
arguments in order to "undermine the cultural influence of a
picture of human nature according to which we are animals and
in addition something else. We have, on this view, a first animal
2
nature and in addition a second distinctively human nature.""
MacIntyre argues that the distinction between animals and
humans should be viewed not as a bright line, but rather as a
spectrum, with the "tipping point" on the spectrum into "human"
nature being the development of the ability to reflect on and pass
judgment on the reason that guides one's actions-the capacity
1 3
for independent practical reasoning.
MacIntyre argues that human flourishing consists of the full
development of this capacity for independent practical
reasoning." 4
The concept of human dependency becomes
significant for MacIntyre when he considers the process by which
a human matures into an independent practical reasoner." 5 One
108 MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 5.

109 See id. at 5-8.
110 Id. at 6 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON PAUL'S FIRST
LETTER TO THE CORINTHIANS, pt. XV, Q, art. 1, at 11).
111 See id. at 35-39 (arguing that animals have perception-based, indeterminate
beliefs that arise from prelinguistic and nonlinguistic distinctions, and that similar
indeterminate beliefs are also observable in humans, particularly in preliguistic
children).
112

Id. at 49-50.

113 Id. at 57-58.
114 See id. at 67, 71 (stating that humans must be able to make independent,
rationally justifiable judgments about what is best for them in order to flourish as
human beings).
115 See id. at 73 ("The history of any self making this transition is of course not
only a history of that particular self, but also a history of those particular others
whose presence or absence, intervention or lack of intervention, are of crucial
importance in determining how far the transition is successfully completed.").
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of the significant steps in this process is acquiring the ability to
distance oneself from one's present desires and the subsequent
ability to evaluate those desires objectively. 116 This capacity
cannot be acquired, MacIntyre argues, without the help of
others. 1 17 For one thing, being an independent practical reasoner
requires mastery of social relationships:
"[T]o learn how to
become an independent practical reasoner is to learn how to
cooperate with others in forming and sustaining those same
relationships that make possible the achievement of common
'11 8
goods by independent practical reasoners."
Further, during the process of this maturation, we will
inevitably experience periods during which we will be dependent
on others for practical support, such as for "nursing, feeding,
clothing, nurturing, teaching, restraining, and advising."'119 This
is certainly true during childhood, and MacIntyre argues that it
will also be true at many other times during a person's life. 120 He
writes:
We need others to help us avoid encountering and falling victim
to disabling conditions, but when, often inescapably, we do fall
victim, either temporarily or permanently, to such conditions as
those of blindness, deafness, crippling injury, debilitating
disease, or psychological disorder, we need others to sustain us,
to help us in obtaining needed, often scarce, resources, to help
us discover what new ways forward there may be, and to stand
in our place from time to time, doing on our behalf what we
cannot do for ourselves ....
Disability is a matter of more or
less, both in respect of degree of disability and in respect of the
time periods in which we are disabled. And at different periods
of our lives we find ourselves, often unpredictably, at very
different points on that scale. When we pass from one such
point to another we need others to recognize that we remain the
same individuals that we were before making this or that
121
transition.

116 See id. at 69 (explaining that in order to be practical reasoners, humans
must be able to question whether a contemplated action is in their best interest, and
that this questioning in turn requires that humans be able to distance themselves
from primitive and infantile desires).

117 See supra note 115.
118 MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 74.
119 Id. at 73.
120 See id. at 73-74.
121 Id.
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After concluding that human flourishing consists of
developing the capacity for independent practical reasoning,
MacIntyre then turns to the question of what kind of social
relationships are necessary to sustain this flourishing, and what
the virtues are that will be necessary to sustain these sorts of
relationships. 122 At this point, his critique of moral philosophy
sounds much like West's critique of liberal rights theory and
formal equality.
Like West, he argues that most moral
123
philosophy begins with an incomplete notion of human nature.
MacIntyre argues that most moral philosophy presupposes
mature,
independent, practical
reasoners
with
adult
relationships, and ignores childhood, old age, disability, and
dependence.1 24 Since practical reasoning is, however, by its
nature, reasoning with others in the context of the specific social
relationships in which one finds oneself, it cannot be learned and
perfected except from within the network of those social
relationships.1 25 MacIntyre argues:
The making and sustaining of those relationships is inseparable
from the development of those dispositions and activities
through which each is directed towards becoming an
independent practical reasoner. So the good of each cannot be
pursued without also pursuing the good of all those who
participate in those relationships. For we cannot have a
practically adequate understanding of our own good, of our own
flourishing, apart from and independently of the flourishing of
that whole set of social relationships in which we have found
126
our place.
This community, this network, cannot flourish as a whole if
it does not recognize the need to support those who are not
capable of independent practical reasoning-those who are
dependent, "the very young and the very old, the sick, the
injured, and the otherwise disabled."'127 He writes:
Each of us achieves our good only if and insofar as others make
our good their good by helping us through periods of disability
Id. at 81.
See id. (explaining that the starting point should be taking a "detailed
account of the dimensions of a child's development" as opposed to "relationships of
the adult world").
124 See id. at 81-82.
125 Id. at 107-08
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 108-09.
122
123
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to become ourselves the kind of human being-through
acquisition and exercise of the virtues-who makes the good of
others her or his good, and this not because we have calculated
that, only if we help others, will they help us, in some trading of
8
advantage for advantage.12
For MacIntyre, though, the notion of dependency is not
significant only because of the fact that it makes the support of
others so essential. 129 The experience of dependency is also
crucial to the lessons one has to learn to develop independent
practical reasoning. 130 The development of independent practical
reasoning is partially the development of the capacity to navigate
relationships.
Thus, the process by which one learns
independent practical reasoning is, in fact, the same process by
which one learns about human flourishing and what kinds of
relationships structure a flourishing communal life. 131 For both
of these lessons, it is crucial to draw on what one has learned in
132
stages of dependence, as well as in stages of independence.
MacIntyre argues that the traditional conceptions of what
virtues are necessary to support the development of independent
practical reasoners are too narrow. 133 The traditional virtues of
justice, temperance, truthfulness, and courage are all virtues in
support of our independence. 34 MacIntyre proposes that we also
recognize a set of virtues that support our dependence, what he
calls "the virtues of acknowledged dependence."'' 35 He does not
think that conventional understandings of virtues accurately
capture this category of virtues. 36
He characterizes them
137
generally as a "just generosity," both in giving and in receiving.
He says that the concept is captured closely by the Lakota
expression "wancantognaka,"

See id. at 108.
Id.
130 Id. at 108-09.
131 Id. at 113.
132 Id. ("[S]ince for a human being to flourish unqualifiedly qua human being, it
is her or his life as a whole that must flourish, the individual has to learn through
experience about the places both of independence and of dependence on others in the
different stages of a flourishing life.").
133 See id. at 119-20.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 120.
136 See id.
137 Id. at 122.
128

129
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the virtue of individuals who recognize responsibilities to
immediate family, extended family, and tribe and who express
that recognition by their participation in ceremonial acts of
uncalculated
giving,
ceremonies
of
thanksgiving,
of
remembrance, and of the conferring of honor ....
Because I
owe it, to fail to exhibit it is to fail in respect of justice; because
what I owe is uncalculated giving, to fail to exhibit it is also to
1 38
fail in respect of generosity.
It is important that the virtue of receiving, as well as giving,
in this spirit, is acknowledged. 139 He argues that these virtues
must include the following:
knowing how to exhibit gratitude, without allowing that
gratitude to be a burden, courtesy towards the graceless giver,
and forbearance towards the inadequate giver. The exercise of
these latter virtues always involves a truthful acknowledgment
of dependence. And they are therefore virtues bound to be
lacking in those whose forgetfulness of their dependence is
expressed in an unwillingness to remember benefits conferred
by others .... For like virtues of giving, those of receiving are
needed in order to sustain just those types of communal
relationship through which the exercise of these virtues first
1 40
has to be learned.
MacIntyre then turns to a discussion of the types of political
and social societies that could embody these virtues and support
his concept of human flourishing.1 4 1
He argues that such a
society would have to satisfy three conditions.1 42 First, it would
have to have political institutions for deliberation and decisionmaking by all independent reasoners on matters requiring
communal consensus.1 43 Second, its norms of justice would have
to be consistent with the exercise of the virtues of just

138 Id. at 120-21. He also cites Aquinas: "[W]hat the virtues require from us are
characteristically types of action that are at once just, generous, beneficent, and
done from pity." Id. at 121. However, he prefers Aquinas's term misericordia to the
English term "pity," "to avoid the association... with condescension." Id. at 123-24.
139 See id. at 126-27 ("mo these virtues of giving must be added virtues of
receiving....").
140 Id. at 126-27.
141 See generally id. at 129-46 (discussing the three necessary conditions in
order to achieve the "types of political and social society that can embody those
relationships of giving and receiving through which our individual common goods
can be achieved").
142 See id. at 129.

143

Id.
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generosity. 144 Finally, its political structures would have to make
it possible for the concerns of those who have no or limited ability
145
to engage in practical reasoning to be heard through proxies.
He writes:
What I am trying to envisage then is a form of political society
in which it is taken for granted that disability and dependence
on others are something that all of us experience at certain
times in our lives and this to unpredictable degrees, and that
consequently our interest in how the needs of the disabled are
adequately voiced and met is not a special interest, the interest
of one particular group rather than of others, but rather the
interest of the whole political society, an interest that is integral
to their conception of their common good. 146

MacIntyre does not think that any recent social or political
philosophy helps us imagine that kind of a society, since it all
focuses on either the nation-state or the family. 147 Neither has
the capacity to recognize the conception of common good that is
48
necessary to practice the virtue of just generosity
3. Comparing West and MacIntyre
Both MacIntyre and West critique existing political theories
for being based on false conceptions of human nature positing
only fully rational, autonomous individuals; both insist that a
correct account of human nature demands the acknowledgment
of the reality of dependency as an inevitable condition of
humanity. 149 Maclntyre, however, spends much more time than
Id. at 129-130. Although
[n]o ...simple formulation will be capable of capturing the different kinds
of norms that will be necessary for different kinds of just
relationships... [b]etween independent practical reasoners the norms will
have to satisfy Marx's formula for justice in a socialist society, according to
which what each receives is proportionate to what each contributes.

144

Id.
145 Id. at 130.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 130-31.
If at this point we turn for assistance to recent social and political
philosophy, we will be for the most part disappointed, since with rare
exceptions work in that area ignores questions about the common goods of
association and relationships that are intermediate between on the one
hand the nation-state and on the other the individual and the nuclear
family.
Id.
148 Id. at 131.
149See id. at 119-28 (noting that "[t]he limitations and blindness of merely self-
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West addressing the impact of conditions of dependency other
than the temporary dependency of childhood. His critique is
richer with respect to the experience of life-long dependency of
those with congenital mental and physical disabilities, and the
experience of temporary disability during the lifetime.
In
essence, he has been more successful at truly generalizing his
critique, by envisioning a fuller panoply of human experiences to
be acknowledged by a comprehensive political theory.
Maclntyre, like West, argues that our notion of "justice"
needs to be reconsidered to incorporate some notion that arises
out of our shared human condition of dependency. 150 Rather than
characterizing this contribution as a right, or a gloss on our
understanding of formal equality, though, MacIntyre suggests
that it is an additional set of "virtues" that ought to be embedded
in our norms of justice-the "virtues of acknowledged
dependence."'151 He understands "just generosity" to include a
recognition of the responsibility each of us has to support others
in times of dependency and an attitude of gratitude for the
152
support that others give us in our times of dependency.
More significant than the characterization of this missing
component of justice as a right, an aspect of justice, or a virtue,
are some other differences between West's and MacIntyre's
theories. First, West constructs her theory from the perspective
of the person giving the care, 153 while MacIntyre constructs his
54
theory from the perspective of the person receiving the care.

interested desire have been catalogued often enough" and highlighting "the virtues
of acknowledged dependence"); WEST, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing "rights of care"
and "our mutual dependency").
150 See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 119-28 (cataloguing the "three salient
characteristics of the relationships that are informed by the virtue of just
generosity").
151 Id. at 120.
But if we are to understand the virtues as enabling us to become
independent practical reasoners, just because they also enable us to
participate in relationships of giving and receiving through which our ends
as practical reasoners are to be achieved, we need to extend our enquiries a
good deal further, by recognizing that any adequate education into the
virtues will be one that enables us to give their due to a set of virtues that
are the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence, the virtues of
acknowledged dependence.
Id.
152 See supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
154 See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 1-4.
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For West, the notion of our shared human dependency is
presented as an argument for all of humanity to recognize the
value of caregiving work and to support the caregiver doing this
work. 155
For Maclntyre, the notion of our shared human
dependency is presented as an argument for all of humanity to
recognize the necessity of receiving caregiving to the flourishing of
all humans, and to encourage the continued provision of care. 156
Second, West's theory proposes recognition of a "right to give
care," rather than the right to receive care. 157 West does not
suggest anything like the "responsibility to care" which is central
to MacIntyre's notion of "just generosity," or any obligation on
the recipient to react in any particular way to the receipt of care
or withholding of care. 5 8 The closest she comes is including in
her humanistic account of formal equality the moral principle of
an egalitarian regard for all, regardless of status, 59 but she does
not go so far as to translate this "regard" into any concrete
obligation.
Third, MacIntyre's theory reflects a much more empowered
notion of the caregiver than West's. 160 MacIntyre essentially
argues that all humans, and all human societies, need caregiving

155 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 1.
We human beings are vulnerable to many kinds of affliction and most of us
are at some time afflicted by serious ills. How we cope is only in small part
up to us. It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our
flourishing, as we encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition,
mental defect and disturbance, and human aggression and neglect. This
dependence on particular others for protection and sustenance is most
obvious in early childhood and in old age. But between these first and last
stages our lives are characteristically marked by longer or shorter periods
of injury, illness or other disablement and some among use are disabled for
their entire lives.
Id.
157 WEST, supra note 9, at 95 (emphasis added). She does, however, acknowledge
that caregivers themselves are dependent and in need of care. See id. ("People who
are providing care to dependents are themselves in need of assistance from
others ....").
158 See id. Interestingly, she does argue that humans sense "moral obligations to
the weak and to those dependent on us," id. at 81, and she uses these moral
intuitions as the basis for part of her critique of the dominant rights theories, see
supra text accompanying notes 84-97. She does not, however, attempt to translate
this into any right to receive care.
159 See WEST, supra note 9, at 19.
160 See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 128 (arguing that humans' caring for each
other is a means "through which our common good can be achieved").
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to flourish. 16' At times each of us will be the caregiver, and at
times each of us will be the cared for. 162 A just society will
recognize that reality and support caregiving because it enables
each one of us to flourish. 163 The recognition that we are all at
times in need of care gives rise not only to the responsibility to
64
provide care, but also the responsibility to be grateful for care.
While West does say at one point that recognizing a "right to
care" would reflect a social consensus that individual and
community flourishing requires care, 165 she focuses much more
on how the besieged caregiver needs the protection of the "right
to care" just to participate fully in society. 166 When arguing for
this recognition of the "right to care," she stresses the need to
protect women from the inegalitarian effects of engaging in
67
systematically undervalued care work.
These differences between MacIntyre and West might simply
reflect their respective levels of engagement with the realities of
caregiving,168 or the influence of their respective "socially
constructed" traditional gender roles, or even their different
academic roles. West as a law professor might be more inclined
to confront the realities of how existing legal structures affect
actual women; MacIntyre as a philosophy professor might be
more inclined to focus on abstract ideals. 69 The dissimilarities
161 See id. at 74 ("[T]o learn how to become an independent practical reasoner is
to learn how to cooperate with others in forming and sustaining those same
relationships that make possible the achievement of common goods ...").
162 See id. at 73 (stating that when we invariably become afflicted by "disabling
conditions" we have no choice but to rely on others).
163 See, e.g., id. at 1 ("It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let

alone our flourishing. .. ").

See id. at 126-27 (labeling gratitude one of the "virtues of receiving" care).
See WEST, supra note 9, at 96.
166 See id. at 95 ("[S]uch relational rights are nowhere mentioned in various
164
165

constitutional documents

. .

. [b]ut they ought to be.").

See id. at 96 ("[Flamilial and economic institutions, if unchecked, will
continue to undercompensate caregiving labor, and ...women will be adversely
impacted, as a group, by that practice.").
168 I know little about the personal life of either author, so I have no evidence to
support this speculation.
169 The philosopher Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
articulated this idea in her
criticism of the ways in which philosophers have taken up the challenge of Pope
John Paul II to create a "new feminism." Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Equality,
Difference, and the Practical Problems of a New Feminism, in WOMEN IN CHRIST,
supra note 22, at 297. She writes:
Catholic and other Christian women have been taking up the challenge,
although most have focused more upon the theory-philosophy and
167
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might reflect a more significant difference in their theories,
however. Let us turn now to the writings of Pope John Paul II in
support of the dependency-based theory of justice, to see if they
shed any light on this question.
II.

A.

POPE JOHN PAUL II'S WRITINGS IN SUPPORT OF A
DEPENDENCY-BASED THEORY OF JUSTICE

John PaulH's Support of Care Feminism

Despite ongoing attempts by many to depict John Paul the
Great as being opposed to feminism, 170 his writings throughout
his pontificate demonstrate a profound respect and robust
intellectual support for many of the arguments in support of
caregivers on the agenda of dependency feminists. 171 It is true
that John Paul profoundly disagreed with many aspects of what
is generally considered to be the predominant feminist agenda, at
least in the United States, such as its insistence that the right to
abortion is fundamental to the advancement of women, 72 and its
denial of anything but socially-constructed differences between
men and women. 173 If you examine John Paul II's writings
addressing the issues raised in the arguments developed by the
dependency feminists, however, you will find not only support for
most of their specific policy recommendations, but also support
for their major arguments. 174 Indeed, in one significant respect,
he makes a major contribution to their argument that could in
175
fact advance their agenda.
theology---of the problem than practical programs. What I shall, with no
disrespect intended, call the retreat to theory testifies to the daunting
complexity of the cultural, political and practical problems.
Id.
170 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Ethical Equality in a New Feminism, in WOMEN
IN CHRIST, supra note 22, at 285, 292 (noting that Pope John Paul II was the target
of feminist protest since the beginning of his papacy).
171 See infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., Theresa Stanton Collett, Independence or Interdependence? A
Christian Response to Liberal Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 178, 188 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
173 See Letter from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger & Archbishop Angelo Amato to
the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the
Church and in the World 6 (May 31, 2004).
174 See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXERCENS
19
(1981) [hereinafter LABOREM EXERCENS] (advocating higher respect for women's
dual roles as workers and caretakers).
175 For a fuller account of the arguments in this section, see Sacrifice, supra
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From the very beginning of his pontificate, John Paul II
advocated changes to the workplace and social structures to
enable women who are caregivers to participate fully in the
workplace. 176 For example, in Laborem Exercens, written in
1981, he argues:
It is a fact that in many societies women work in nearly every
sector of life. But it is fitting that they should be able to fulfill
their tasks in accordance with their own nature, without being
discriminated against and without being excluded from jobs for
which they are capable, but also without lack of respect for their
family aspirations and for their specific role in contributing,
together with men, to the good of society. The true advancement
of women requires that labour should be structured in such a
way that women do not have to pay for their advancement by
abandoning what is specific to them and at the expense of the
family, in which women as mothers have an irreplaceable
role. 177

In FamiliarisConsortio, written the same year, he claims:
There is no doubt that the equal dignity and responsibility of
men and women fully justifies women's access to public
functions. On the other hand the true advancement of women
requires that clear recognition be given to the value of their
maternal and family role, by comparison with all other public
roles and all other professions. Furthermore, these roles and
professions should be harmoniously combined, if we wish the
178
evolution of society and culture to be truly and fully human.
And in Evangelium Vitae, fourteen years later, he writes:
There need to be set in place social and political initiatives
capable of guaranteeing conditions of true freedom of choice in
matters of parenthood. It is also necessary to rethink labor,
urban, residential and social service policies so as to harmonize
working schedules with time available for the family, so that it
becomes effectively possible to take care of children and the
79
elderly.1

note 11, at 7-12.
176 See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE
90 (1995)
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE]; LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 174, 19; JOHN
PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO 23 (1981) [hereinafter

FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO].
177
178
179

LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 174, 19.
FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO, supra note 176, 23.
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supranote 176, 90.
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These statements reflect strong support for the types of
specific policy recommendations that the dependency feminists
argue follow from their theories.1 80 Indeed, in Laborem Exercens
John Paul II offers three fairly specific suggestions echoing many
of these proposals: (1) direct economic compensation for care
work, in the form of a family wage sufficient to support the entire
family or other forms of financial support for mothers engaging
solely in childcare; (2) reform of social structures to ensure that
women who work at home are not penalized for their dedication
to the socially significant work of preserving families; and
(3) restructuring the workplace to ensure that women are not
penalized by the job market for the work they do within the
18
family. '
John Paul II's writings also support the specific arguments
made by the dependency feminists to support their policy
recommendations. 8 2 Recall the first argument of the dependency
feminists-the need for social re-evaluation of care work. John
Paul II has no equal as advocate for the social value of
dependency care.
His arguments echo many of the themes
sounded by the dependency feminists in articulating the social
value of care work. In FamiliarisConsortio, John Paul identifies
the family as having
vital and organic links with society, since it is its foundation
and nourishes it continually ....

[1]t is from the family that

citizens come to birth and it is within the family that they find
the first school of the social virtues that are the animating
principle of the existence and the development of society
83
itself.1
John Paul's appreciation for the family as a "school of the
social virtues" encompasses much more than just learning to be a
good citizen, however. His conviction about the importance of the
work of preserving the family rests on the fundamental,
foundational concept of the truth about the human person-that
180 See,
e.g., LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 174,
19 (suggesting
remuneration for a woman's caregiving efforts, a social re-evaluation of the role
mothers play inside the home, and labor reforms that would make it easier for
working mothers to accomplish their dual roles as three ways to make the current
socioeconomic system more just).

181 Id.
182 See,

e.g., FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO, supra note
importance of the family as a basic societal structure).
183

Id.

176,

42

(arguing the
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all humans are created in the image and likeness of God. 8 4 This
profound truth is, as John Paul II writes in Centisimus Annus,
the "main thread and.., the guiding principle of... all of the
Church's social doctrine."18 5 The family must be preserved
because it is the best social structure in which humans can learn
this powerful truth.1 8 6 He notes that
faced with a society that is running the risk of becoming more
and more depersonalized and standardized and therefore
inhuman and dehumanizing, with the negative results of many
forms of escapism-such as alcoholism, drugs and even
terrorism-the family possesses and continues still to release
formidable energies capable of taking man out of his anonymity,
keeping him conscious of his personal dignity, enriching him
uniqueness
with deep humanity and actively placing him, in8his
7
and unrepeatability, within the fabric of society.'
Let us now turn to the second step in the dependency
theorists' argument, the step in which they find it necessary to
reformulate existing theories of justice. Recall that this step was
where the dependency theorists responded to the possibility that
a re-valuation of care work could be accomplished by simply
88
paying women to stay home and take care of their dependents.'
To justify social and legal reforms that make it possible for
women with significant dependent care responsibilities to stay
active in the public sphere, the dependency feminists have to find
a rationale for treating women with dependent care
without
such
than
women
differently
responsibilities
The required reforms are much more
responsibilities.
complicated than simply paying women to stay home to do their
care work. 189
Traditional feminism could rely on traditional notions of
justice, resting on notions of formal equality, because it was
willing to accept that women should either reject dependency
184

JOHN

PAUL

II,

ENCYCLICAL LETTER

CENTISIMUS ANNUS

[hereinafter CENTISIMUS ANNUS].
185 Id. (citing PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUMET SPES
(emphasis added).
43.
186 FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO, supra note 176,
187 Id.
188 See
189 See

11

(1991)

24 (1965))

supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
Deborah Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 846 (2002)
(describing the obstacles in the workplace, in law, and in childcare faced by women
aiming to balance their lives between their responsibilities outside the home and
their care work).

400

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:369

care or force men to do more dependency care. Under those
circumstances, treating women just like men in the workplace
would be sufficient to ensure progress by women. However, the
dependency feminists argue that women with significant
dependent care responsibilities have a right to be treated
unequally from women without such responsibilities. 190 They
argue that "justice" should be understood to embrace such
unequal treatment, based on the social value of care work, as
well as on a social empathy for the needs of dependents for
care. 191 Although this argument is being advanced by feminists
precisely because it is predominantly women who would benefit
from this broader theory of justice, the argument is genderneutral. The same generous inequality of treatment should be
extended
to
men
with
significant
dependent
care
92
1
responsibilities.
Similarly, John Paul II argues that women with significant
dependent care responsibilities should be treated differently in
the workplace and in other social structures than women without
such responsibilities. 193 As a basis for his arguments, however,
he does not rely merely on a social recognition of the value of care
work, or the enshrinement of empathy for dependents in need of
care.' 94 He makes an even more compelling argument that
women bring something of value to the workplace and all public
spheres that men do not bring-namely, the manifestations of
their "feminine genius."'195
What John Paul offers the
dependency feminists is, to borrow the title of a popular local
continuing legal education program for practicing lawyers in
Minneapolis, a "business case for diversity" in the workplace. 196
190 See KITrAY, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that the concept of equality
masks inequities inherent in a society where women are traditionally called on to
care for dependents).
191 See, e.g., supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
192 Indeed, many dependency theorists note that the social changes affected by
such a broader understanding of justice would most likely provide men with the
support and social affirmation they need to assume greater care responsibilities. See,
e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 58 (explaining one goal of reconstructive feminism is
to allow fathers to increase their capacity as caregivers).
193 See JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO WOMEN 4 (1995) [hereinafter LETTER TO
WOMEN] (arguing for advances in equality for mothers in the workplace).
194 For a discussion of how women are entrusted to be source of special support
for human beings by virtue of their femininity, see JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC
LETTER MULIERIS DIGNITATEM 30 (1988) [hereinafter MULIERIS DIGNITATEM].
195 LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193, 10.
196 1 have borrowed this phrase from an article entitled A Business Case for
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He argues that society should accept accommodations for
working mothers because women bring something to the
workplace that men do not bring. 19 7 John Paul II has no problem
whatsoever with the notion that men and women have different
gifts and capacities. 198 He believes that both need to be present
in the public sphere to effect the transformation of culture to
more fully reflect the truth about the human person. 99
In Mulieris Dignitatem, his 1988 Apostolic Letter "On the
Dignity and Vocation of Women,"200 he presents an account of
this "genius" that illustrates its force. 20 1 John Paul II believes
that women have a unique capacity for developing a special
sensitivity to the fact that humans exist to be loved, a special
awareness that each and every human is entrusted to each and
every other human being.20 2 This "feminine genius" consists of a
special ability to appreciate each human being's obligation to love
every other human being, 20 3 arising out of the truth that we are
all loved by God and that we are all created in the image and
likeness of God.20 4 Again, that fundamental truth is the "main
thread and.., the guiding principle of... all of the Church's

Diversity by the Southern Minnesota Initiative Foundation, which is available at
http://www.smifoundation.org/NewGroundFEB06.pdf#search=%22%22A%20busines
s%20case%20for%20diversity%22%20%26%2OMinneapolis%22.
197 See MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194, I 29-31 (finding support in the
Letter to the Ephesians for the proposition that women are specifically entrusted to
give love, the highest of the orders, and stating that the women who have fulfilled
this role "become[] an irreplaceable support and source of spiritual strength for other
people" and thus "are owed much by their families, and sometimes by whole
nations").
198 See MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194, 10 ("The personal resources of
femininity are certainly no less than the resources of masculinity: they are merely
different.").
199See LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193, 4.
200 MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194.
201 See id. IT 29-31.
202 See id. 1 30.

The moral and spiritual strength of a woman is joined to her awareness
that God entrusts the human being to her in a special way. Of course, God
entrusts every human being to each and every other human being. But this
entrusting concerns women in a special way-precisely by reason of their
femininity-and this in a particular way determines their vocation.
Id.
203 See id. 7 30-31 (calling women's sense of responsibility for the well-being of
others the "'genius' which belongs to women").
204 See id.
29 (explaining "the intimate linking of the order of love-which
enters the world of human persons through a Woman-with the Holy Spirit").
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social doctrine"2 5-the same truth that the Church maintains
20 6
the family structure is so good at preserving and transmitting.
In Mulieris Dignitatem, Pope John Paul II makes it
abundantly clear that he understands this genius to be an
intellectual as well as an emotional capacity, something much
more advanced than the notion that women are better than men
at caring for others. 20 7 Mulieris Dignitatem includes detailed
examinations of Jesus Christ's relationships with the women in
his life-from his mother, Mary, to his friends and followers,
Martha and her sister Mary; the women who stayed at the foot of
his cross when all but one of his male Apostles fled; the women
who first saw his empty tomb on Easter morning; and the women
20 8
who were called to announce his resurrection to the Apostles.
John Paul II emphasizes again and again that Jesus relies on
these women for more than just care or nurturing. 20 9 Indeed,
Martha is rebuked for her "preoccupation with domestic
2 10
matters," while her sister, Mary, is listening to Jesus' teaching.
John Paul writes, "Christ speaks to women about the things of
God, and they understand them; there is a true response of mind
and heart, a response of faith. Jesus expresses an appreciation
211
and admiration for this distinctly 'feminine response'....,
What is more, John Paul II calls on women to continue to
bring this special genius to bear on the pressing social issues of
the day. In his 1995 Letter to Women, he writes:
Women will increasingly play a part in the solution of the
serious problems of the future: ... euthanasia, drugs, health

care, the ecology, etc. In all these areas a greater presence of
women in society will prove most valuable, for it will help to
manifest the contradictions present when society is organized
solely according to the criteria of efficiency and productivity,
and it will force systems to be redesigned in a way which favors

205 CENTISIMUSANNUS, supra note 184,
13.
206 See id.

1 11 (emphasis added).

207 See MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194, 15.
3-4, 15-16. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of
208 See id.
Mulieris Dignitem, see Mothers, supra note 11, at 34-42.
14-16 (explaining Christ's
209 See MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194,
appreciation for the faith and fidelity of the female followers, and how they were
entrusted with divine truths and responsibility for their own souls).
15.
210 Id.
211 Id. (emphasis added).
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the pro- cesses [sic] of humanization which mark the
"civilization of love. 212
And in Mulieris Dignitatem, he writes:
In our own time, the successes of science and technology make it
possible to attain material well-being to a degree hitherto
unknown. While this favours some, it pushes others to the
edges of society. In this way, unilateral progress can also lead
to a gradual loss of sensitivity for man, that is, for what is
essentially human. In this sense, our time in particular awaits
the manifestation of that "genius" which belongs to women, and

which can ensure sensitivity for human beings in every
circumstance: because they are human!-and because "the
greatest of these is love"... 213
John Paul II clearly believes that women's gifts are equally
essential both in the home, in the preservation of the family, and
outside of the home, to shape a society to reflect more fully the
image of God. 2 14 This motivates Pope John Paul II to call for
restructuring the workplace and other social structures to permit
the participation of women with children. 2 15 It also motivates his
calls for reforms to ensure those women who dedicate themselves
21 6
to dependency care work are not penalized for this choice.
In summary, John Paul II fully supports the call of
21 7
dependency feminists for a social re-evaluation of care work.
He also agrees with their claim that this social re-evaluation
should not be accomplished merely by paying women to stay
home and perform this work, or by paying more to fathers whose
wives devote themselves to doing such work. 21 8 Dependency
theorists rely on an expanded notion of justice, based on a
recognition of the social value of care work and an empathy for
those needing care, 21 9 to support their arguments.
212 LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193, 4.
213MULIERISDIGNITATEM, supra note 194, 30.
214 See LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193,
12 (stating that "the basic plan of
the Creator takes flesh in the history of humanity" through the work of women, both
those whom history remembers as great and famous as well as those who "place
themselves at the service of others in their everyday lives").
215 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 174,
19.
216 See LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193,
4 (describing motherhood as the
gift to which humanity owes its survival and one that should be rewarded).
217 See id. (noting that it behooves society to recognize the value of women and
the role they fulfill).
218 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 174, 19.
219 See WEST, supra note 9, at 95 (noting that when women are acting as
caregivers they are in need of "support and sustenance," and that society should
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John Paul offers an even more compelling argument, namely
that women have something to offer the workplace that is of vital
importance, something that they can offer to a greater extent
than men.
Because John Paul believes that this unique
"feminine genius" is sufficient to support the specific policy
agenda of the dependency feminists, 220 he does not find it
necessary to articulate a reconstructed notion of justice in this
context. Let us turn to other writings, then, to determine
whether we can find support for a more general dependencybased theory of justice, outside of the context of issues particular
to working mothers.
B.

John Paul II's Support of a More General Dependency-Based
Theory of Justice

John Paul clearly agrees with both West and MacIntyre that
contemporary notions of justice are based on a flawed image of
the human as an autonomous, independent being. 221 He begins
Evangelium Vitae by observing that contemporary society is
replete with declarations of human rights, but that "these noble
proclamations are unfortunately contradicted by a tragic
repudiation of them in practice.
This denial is still more
distressing.., precisely because it is occurring in a society which
makes the affirmation and protection of human rights its
primary objective and its boast. '222 The "roots of this remarkable
contradiction" he attributes to
the mentality which ...recognizes as a subject of rights only
the person who enjoys full or at least incipient autonomy and
who emerges from a state of total dependence on
others .... We must also mention the mentality which tends to

equate personal dignity with the capacity for verbal and explicit,
or at least perceptible, communication. It is clear that on the
basis of these presuppositions there is no place in the world for
anyone who, like the unborn or the dying, is a weak element in
the social structure, or for anyone who appears completely at

recognize this cycle of caregiving being provided by women and their subsequent
need for "support and sustenance" as part of our social fabric).
220 See generally LETTER TO WOMEN, supra note 193,
9-10 (explaining that
women possess the innate ability to understand the nuances in human relations and
spiritual values).
221 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 176, 20 (noting that today's society is
under the false impression that each human is autonomous).
222 Id.
18.
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the mercy of others and radically dependent on them, and can
only communicate through the silent language of a profound
2 23
sharing of affection.
He finds another root of this contradiction in "a notion of
freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way,
and gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service
224
of them.
John Paul, however, goes farther than either West or
MacIntyre in the breadth of what he considers to be the relevant
John Paul II
possible human dependency experiences. 225
criticizes dominant human rights theories for failing to consider
the very weakest and most dependent of all humans-the unborn
child. 226 He argues that our current notions of justice, which
consider only the autonomous, independent human as the
legitimate subject of "human rights," have given rise to political
structures in which
the original and inalienable right to life is questioned or denied
on the basis of a parliamentary vote or the will of one part of the
people-even if it is the majority .... The state is no longer the
"common home" where all can live together on the basis of
principles of fundamental equality, but is transformed into a
tyrant State, which arrogates to itself the right to dispose of the
life of the weakest and most defenseless members, from the
unborn child to the elderly, in the name of a public interest
which is really nothing but the interest of one part .... "How is
it still possible to speak of the dignity of every human person
when the killing of the weakest and most innocent is permitted?
In the name of what justice is the most unjust of
discriminations practiced: some individuals are held to be
227
deserving of defense and others are denied that dignity?"
John Paul II and West disagree about how the current
conception of "human rights" could be salvaged. According to
West, the solution is to supplement the paradigm of the "human"
subject to those rights by "forthrightly acknowledg[ing] the

223

Id.

224

Id.

19 (emphasis added).

See id.
See id. (explaining that human rights proponents should advocate for unborn
children precisely because of their inability to verbally communicate, yet they do
not).
227 Id.
20 (quoting John Paul II, Address to the Participants at the Study
Conference on 'The Right to Life and Europe" (Dec. 18, 1987)).
225
226
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228
natural reality of our inescapable dependence on each other,"229
and add a "right to ... care" to the panoply of protected rights.
John Paul II argues for a more radical reorientation of the
paradigm of the "human" subject to rights, namely a recognition
that human nature is a reflection of the image of God. 230 John
Paul II's writings suggest the same sort of disagreement with
Simply
West's humanistic account of formal equality. 231
supplementing the notion of equality with a recognition of our
shared humanity, dependency, and vulnerability, and adding the
moral principle of egalitarian regard for all, regardless of status,
23 2
to the panoply of values served by the concept of equality,
would not suffice. 233 In the words of Cardinal Avery Dulles, John
Paul II believes that
authentic democracy is possible only on the basis of a correct
conception of the human person. Human rights cannot be
secure unless they are founded in God the Creator. If all
human beings are created equal, and are entitled to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness, this is because God has made
them to his own image and likeness. Without this234transcendent
grounding, human rights would not be inviolable.
Although MacIntyre's dependency theory does not explicitly
incorporate a transcendent version of human nature, 235 his
notion of incorporating the "virtues of acknowledged dependence"
or of just generosity into the norms of justice by which a state
should be governed 236 is compatible with John Paul's teachings.
John Paul asserts that we do have affirmative responsibilities
toward others, and, like MacIntyre, that the exercise of those

WEST, supra note 9, at 95.
Id.
230 See LE7I'ER TO WOMEN, supra note 193, 1 7; see also MULIERIS DIGNITATEM,
7 (referring to a description in Genesis of man and woman being
supra note 194,
created in the image of God).
231 Cf. WEST, supra note 9, at 151 (noting the author's interpretation of formal
equality that all individuals should be treated alike as an expression of "the
universality of [human] nature").
232 See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
233 See WEST, supra note 9, at 149-50 (noting that failing to "treat likes alike"
would result in limiting one's individual liberty and destroying social tradition).
228
229

234 AVERY DULLES, THE SPLENDOR OF FAITH: THE THEOLOGICAL VISION OF POPE

JOHN PAUL II 148 (1999).
235 MacIntyre does, however, embrace Thomism, noting that Aquinas is "plainly
right" in identifying the qualities that set humans apart from animals. MACINTYRE,
supra note 7, at 54.
236

Id. at 120.
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responsibilities is essential to our flourishing. 237 John Paul calls
these responsibilities "love." In Mulieris Dignitatem, he presents
an account of how this responsibility to love others relates to
human flourishing 238 that echoes much of MacIntyre's account of
the development of an independent practical reasoner.
Like MacIntyre, John Paul considers our embodiment to be
of crucial importance. 23 9 Indeed, he considers our particular
embodiment as men or women to be significant. 240 It is not an
accident that the image of God represented in humanity consists
of both the male and the female. 24 1 This aspect of the image of
God that we humans all reflect gives us access to the mystery of
God's identity as the Trinity. 242 This model of God as a
"communion of Persons," in the Trinity, illustrates the truth that
a person cannot come to know God by herself. God exists as a
Trinity of beings in relationship with each other. 2 43 We have to
understand "relationship" to understand God; we cannot
understand relationship except by experiencing relationship, and
that can only be done with others. 244 By creating humanity as
two distinct types of humans, man and woman, God gives us
245
access to this aspect of Himself.

237 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 176,
8 (noting the "responsibility which
every person has towards others").
238 For a separate discussion of the interdependence of these two concepts, see

generally KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 130-31 (H.T. Willetts trans.,
Ignatius Press 1993) (1981).
239 See MULIERIS DIGNITATEM, supra note 194,
1 (discussing this embodiment
as the "immutable basis of all Christian anthropology").
240

See id.

See id. (discussing the purposeful existence of man and woman as a part of
God's plan).
242 See id. (noting the essential relationship between the male-female unity and
the Trinity).
243 Id.
244 Id. John Paul II writes:
The model for this interpretation of the person is God himself as Trinity, as
a communion of Persons. To say that man is created in the image and
likeness of God means that man is called to exist "for" others, to become a
gift.
This applies to every human being, whether woman or man, who live it
out in accordance with the special qualities proper to each.
241

Id.
245 See id. (noting that by creating the male and female roles, God gave humans
access to His Triune nature).

408

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:369

The particular relationship to which John Paul argues God
calls us is love. 246 John Paul believes that women play a special
role in illustrating to humanity both aspects of this
commandment-both being loved and loving.247 The femininity of
humanity-represented by women-reflects the truth that we
are all loved by God. 248 Although both men and women share
equally in this task of loving, the Church argues that women
have a special appreciation for our obligation to love each other,
because of a special sensitivity to the fact humans exist to be
loved.249 The Church explains:
The moral and spiritual strength of a woman is joined to her
awareness that God entrusts the human being to her in a special
way. Of course, God entrusts every human being to each and
every other human being. But his entrusting concerns women
in a special way..... A woman is strong because of her
awareness of this entrusting,strong because of the fact that God
"entrusts the human being to her," always and in every way,
even in the situations of social discrimination in which she may
find herself.

250

John Paul's conviction that the human cannot understand
herself except through relationship with others corresponds to
MacIntyre's conviction that a human cannot develop into an
independent practical reasoner except through relationship with
others. Further, MacIntyre's insistence that the virtue of just
generosity encompasses virtues of giving as well as receiving
corresponds to John Paul's insistence that humans are called to
learn to love as well as to be loved.
Indeed, much of what MacIntyre seems to be searching for in
his description of the virtue of just generosity seems to be present
in John Paul's description of what he calls the "Christian virtue"
John Paul II writes:
Love is an ontological and ethical requirement of the person. The person
must be loved, since love alone corresponds to what the person is. This

246

Id.

explains the commandment of love, known already in the Old Testament
and placed by Christ at the very centre of the Gospel "ethos." This also
explains the primacy of love expressed by Saint Paul in the First Letter to
the Corinthians: "the greatest of these is love."
29 (quoting Corinthians13:13 (New American)) (citations omitted).
247

See id.

248

See id. (noting the particular role of women in loving as expressed "by the

fact of her femininity").
249 See id.
30.
250

Id.
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of solidarity. 25 1 John Paul describes solidarity as the virtue that
is the moral and social attitude resulting from a recognition of
humanity's interdependence. 252 He describes solidarity as:
not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the
contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit
oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and
of each individual, because we are all really responsible for
253
all.
John Paul's conception of solidarity also seems to encompass
MacIntyre's conception of just generosity as something that
should affect the attitude of both the giver and the recipient of
aid:
The exercise of solidarity within each society is valid when its
members recognize one another as persons. Those who are
more influential, because they have a greater share of goods and
common services, should feel responsible for the weaker and be
ready to share with them all they possess. Those who are
weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity, should
not adopt a purely passive attitude or one that is destructive of
legitimate rights,
the social fabric, but, while claiming their
254
should do what they can for the good of all.
In summary, it appears that there is ample support in John
Paul II's writings for a general dependency-based theory of
justice. In a number of respects, he takes current attempts to
develop such a theory a step further. For instance, he provides
additional arguments for the dependency-based theory of justice
as an alternative to an equality-based theory of justice to support
restructuring the workplace to accommodate parenting. He also
casts a wider net for those who such a theory would seek to
protect, including not only the permanently disabled, but also the
unborn. And he is clearly more aggressive than West in
asserting a duty, as well as a right, to care for those who are
dependent on us. At the same time, though, John Paul's writings
suggest the limitations of a dependency-based theory of justice

40 (1987).
251 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SOcL4Ls
38 ("When interdependence becomes recognized [as a system
252 See id.

determining relationships] the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as
a 'virtue,' is solidarity.").
253 Id.
254 Id.
39.
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such as West's, which does not acknowledge any relation to the
transcendent.
MacIntyre's theory, while not expressly acknowledging any
relation to the transcendent, demonstrates that a dependencybased theory of justice expressed in purely secular terms could
come closer in spirit to the Christ-centered personalism of John
Paul the Great. Both theories insist that humans cannot flourish
except in relationships, and that these relationships must be
based on reciprocal responsibilities to care to and allow others to
care for us, including a special responsibility toward those who
are weaker, or more dependent. What MacIntyre struggles to
define as the "virtues of acknowledged dependency," John Paul
finds adequately contained in the Christian virtue of solidarity.
In the end, it appears to me that the writings of John Paul
not only support, but significantly advance, the project of
articulating a general dependency-based theory of justice, with
applications beyond the context of supporting motherhood. Even
proponents of a dependency-based theory of justice who are not
comfortable with the vocabulary of faith used by John Paul might
borrow from him certain concepts that could be translated into
secular vocabulary that would strengthen their arguments:
acceptance of gender-based distinctions in gifts and perspectives
that support arguments to restructure the workplace to allow
fuller participation of women; a recognition of the full spectrum
of human dependency conditions entitled to protection under this
theory; and acknowledgement that the human condition of
dependency might justify a "right" of dependents to receive care,
as well as a right of caregivers to provide care.
At the same time, proponents of a dependency-based theory
of justice who are motivated by faith convictions must
acknowledge the persuasive power of many of the arguments
presented by dependency-based theorists in purely secular terms.
Although it may be true, as John Paul argues, that human rights
cannot be secured unless they are grounded in the transcendent,
West's pragmatic arguments for legal scholars in particular to
labor to reclaim the language of "rights," and develop a richer
jurisprudence of positive and relational rights, are compelling.
Indeed, without following West's suggestions in this regard, it is
hard to imagine how legal scholars sympathetic to a dependencybased theory of justice might hope to affect, to use West's
terminology, "legal justice"-
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the justice we hope law promotes[,] ...the justice that lawyers

and judges, peculiarly, are professionally committed to pursue,
the virtue around which, arguably, the legal profession and the
individuals within it have defined their public lives... to which
255
we urge our students to dedicate themselves ....
Let us now turn to a preliminary exploration of some areas of the
law in which a dependency-based theory of justice might make a
practical difference in advocating for legal developments
compatible with Catholic social teachings.
III. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF A GENERAL DEPENDENCY-BASED
THEORY OF JUSTICE

It would be beyond the scope of this article to fully explore
any particular application of this theory to specific legal issues,
but I close with some preliminary thoughts about how it might be
applied to two areas of particular interest to me: disability rights
and consumer protection.
The area of disability rights would seem to be a prime
candidate for application of the dependency-based theory of
justice, but determining how this theory would play out in this
area would have to be done with great care and delicacy. The
Americans with Disabilities Act 256 (the "ADA") is largely
considered to represent the culmination of an evolution of
American attitudes towards people with disabilities from objects
of charity or welfare to "a minority group entitled to the same
hard-won legal protections for equality that emerged from the
struggles of African Americans and women." 257 Its passage was a
hard-fought victory, won only after years of struggle by members
of the disability rights movement to have their demands for equal
opportunity recognized as a civil rights issue rather than a
welfare issue. 258 Essentially, the ADA prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities in employment, in access to
services, programs, or activities offered by public entities, and in
access to public accomodations and facilities offered by private
entities. To the extent that "reasonable accommodations" would
facilitate access of people with disabilities to jobs, services,
255 WEST, supra note 9, at 1.
256 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 101-12, 213 (2000).
257 PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 1-3 (2004).
258 See generally JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US:
DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT (1998).
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programs, activities, or accommodations, the law imposes an
259
affirmative obligation to make such accommodations.
Disability rights activists are extremely sensitive to the
distinction between empowering people with disabilities to
participate fully in society (which they argue is represented by
the ADA's approach) and marginalizing people with disabilities
by exempting them from the responsibilities of citizens
participating fully in society. As Anita Silvers writes:
There is all the difference in the world between conceiving of
people with disabilities as equal and thereby as deserving only
such differentiated treatment as is needed to reform social
practice that excludes them and thinking of them as deficient
and thereby as deserving special benefits, entitlements, and
exemptions to sustain them in their exclusion from the
mainstream of commercial and civic life. Policies that promote
the former view controvert the beliefs about people with
disabilities that motivate the latter view. Policies informed by
the latter view enfeeble the purpose needed to implement the
260
former view.
Indeed, this sensitivity leads Silvers to criticize MacIntyre's
project, which she understands as making society's virtue depend
on the neediness of the ill and disabled; she argues that this
could give rise to a duty on the part of the disabled to refrain
from asserting their independence from their caregivers, since
that might impede the caregiver's "progressing along paths of
virtue."

261

Despite this sensitivity, I believe that there are a number of
issues in the disability law area for which the development of a
jurisprudence shaped by a dependency-based theory of justice
might help shape law more consistent with Catholic social
teachings. Dependency-based theories of justice might be helpful
in analyzing the increasingly restrictive interpretations of the
ADA, social security, welfare, and special education laws for
people with disabilities. Another emerging issue is the question
of whether the formal-equality-plus-reasonable-accommodations
approach established by the ADA adequately addresses the needs
of people with significant mental, rather than physical,
259

See 42 U.S.C. § 12, 112(b)(5)(A).

260

Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in

DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:

PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

et al. eds., 1998)
261 Id. at 38-39.

13, 138 (Anita Silvers
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disabilities. Some disability rights activists are beginning to
struggle with this question. 262 I think the broader notions of
justice developed in the context of dependency care could be very
relevant to this analysis.
Another area of the law that reflects this same tension
between empowerment and protection is the area of consumer
protection. One of the thorniest issues in consumer protection is
the tension between protecting consumers from making unwise
choices by denying choice to them and empowering them to make
better choices. This tension is graphically played out in the area
of predatory lending. Lenders claim that laws prohibiting
practices identified as "predatory" force them from certain
markets, leaving borrowers no choice but to go to even less
scrupulous lenders. I think it is possible that a dependencybased theory of justice might provide some basis for asserting a
mutual responsibility on the part of the lenders and the
borrowers. A recognition of the economic "dependency" of certain
borrowers, with little access to convention sources of credit,
might be the basis for the assertion of some responsibility on the
part of the lender to offer credit on reasonably fair terms. Such
an argument could support recent calls for more responsible
marketing by predatory lenders, 263 or for the imposition of
"suitability" standards, similar to those imposed on stock
brokers, on lenders making predatory loans. 264 At the same time,
though, the dependency-based theory of justice, with its
insistence on reciprocity of obligation between the powerful and
the weak, might also support increased responsibilty on the part

262 For example, Silvers hints at this struggle when she generally rejects
allocating extraordinary resources to people with disabilities, except to rectify unjust
results of past discrimination. She also excepts
redistributing by broadening responsibility for the care of the subset of
individuals with disabilities who are truly needy rather than merely
constructed as being so ... ; here policy is concerned not with justice for the
disabled but instead with justice of those nondisabled individuals for whom
the responsibility of caring for a disabled person is unfairly burdensome.
Id. at 35. I would argue that a dependency-based theory of justice might support a
policy that is concerned with justice for both for the people with disabilities who are
truly needy and for their caregivers.
263 See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005).
264 See Patricia A. McCoy & Kathleen C. Engel, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002).
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of the borrower to only accept credit that is necessary and can
actually be repaid.
While the exact contours of the dependency-based theory of
justice in these specific contexts would require careful work, I
think it would be a fruitful effort. Indeed, it might prove to be
one of the most concrete ways for Catholic legal scholars to
memorialize the jurisprudential legacy of Pope John Paul the
Great.

